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IN DEFENSE OF THE COMPOSSIBILITY OF 
PRESENTISM AND TIME TRAVEL 
Thomas HALL 
ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel 
from two objections. One objection is that the presentist’s model of time leaves nowhere 
to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. 
After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists 
have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional 
Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of the objections fail. 
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1. Introduction 
Presentism is a thesis about temporal ontology according to which it is necessarily 
the case that only present entities exist.1 Many philosophers have said that 
presentism precludes the possibility of time travel. For example, William Grey has 
said that the possibility of time travel would have to “presuppose that the past or 
future were somehow real,”2 and Steven Hales has said that “there is no such thing 
as time travel under presentism.”3 In addition, several philosophers have endorsed 
the view that time travel is possible only if eternalism (sometimes called ‘four-
dimensionalism’) is true – the view that past, present, and future entities all exist 
on an ontological par. William Godfrey-Smith, for example, has said that “the 
metaphysical picture which underlies time travel talk is that of the block 
                                                                
1 There is some variation in how presentism is formulated. Some authors add that it is always 
the case that everything is present (e.g. see Thomas M. Crisp, “Presentism,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Metaphysics, eds. Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 215), and others add that the only properties and relations that present 
entities instantiate are those they currently instantiate (e.g. see Theodore Sider, “Traveling in A- 
and B- Time,” The Monist 88, 3 (2005): 329). Also, some authors do not (explicitly) formulate 
presentism as a metaphysically necessary thesis. Nothing in this paper will turn on such 
variation. For defenses of presentism, see Crisp, “Presentism;” Ned Markosian, “A Defense of 
Presentism,” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume I, ed. Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); and Craig Bourne, A Future for Presentism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
2 William Grey, “Troubles with Time Travel,” Philosophy 74, 1 (1999): 56. 
3 Steven Hales, “No Time Travel for Presentists,” Logos & Episteme 1, 2 (2010): 360. 
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universe,”4 and Ken Perszyk and Nicholas Smith agree that “[f]or time travel to be 
possible, we need a different conception of time: four-dimensionalism.”5 Although 
there have been a few dissenters,6 this appears to be the common view. 
The aim of this paper is to join the dissenters and show that the common 
view isn’t any good. Towards this end, I will evaluate two arguments that purport 
to show that presentism rules out the possibility of time travel: the Nowhere 
Argument (§2) and the Suicide Machine Argument (§3). After exposing some 
misplaced scrutiny of the first argument, I will ultimately respond to the 
arguments on behalf of the presentist.7  
2. The Nowhere Argument 
Simon Keller and Michael Nelson dub the following argument the ‘Nowhere 
Argument:’ 
On the presentist model, the past and the future do not exist, so there is nowhere 
for the time traveller to go. Travelling to Portland is possible, because Portland is 
right there waiting for you. But travelling to the Land of Oz is impossible, 
because there is no such place. Travelling to the past or future is more like 
travelling to the Land of Oz, if presentism is true. You can’t travel to somewhere 
that doesn’t exist, so, if presentism is true, you can’t travel to other points in 
time.8  
                                                                
4 William Godfrey-Smith, “Travelling in Time,” Analysis 40, 2 (1980): 72. 
5 Ken Perszyk and Nicholas Smith, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” in Maui and the White 
Rabbit: Maori and Pakeha Concepts of Time, ed. Hamish Campbell (Te Papa: National Museum 
of New Zealand Press, 2001), 4. 
6 See Simon Keller and Michael Nelson, “Presentists Should Believe in Time Travel,” Australian 
Journal of Philosophy 79, 3 (2001): 333-45; Paul Daniels, “Back to the Present: Defending 
Presentist Time Travel,” Disputatio 4, 33 (2012): 469-84; and Ryan Wasserman, The Paradoxes 
of Time Travel (manuscript). 
7 One noteworthy restriction. I will only be concerned with closed-future presentism – that is, 
presentism plus the view that future-tensed contingent statements are either determinately true 
or determinately false. Kristie Miller has argued that time travel is incompatible with open-
future presentism – that is, presentism plus the view that future-tensed contingent statements 
are neither determinately true nor determinately false. See Kristie Miller, “Time Travel and the 
Open Future,” Disputatio 1, 19 (2005): 223-32; and Kristie Miller, “Backwards Causation, Time, 
and the Open Future,” Metaphysica 9, 2 (2008): 173-91. For a response to Miller, see Daniels, 
“Back to the Present.”  
8 Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should,” 334-5. 
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Initially the argument is quite compelling.9 However, we should take a 
closer look: 
THE NOWHERE ARGUMENT 
(P1) If presentism is true, then necessarily, the past and future do not exist. 
(P2) It is impossible to travel somewhere that does not exist.  
(C1) If presentism is true, then it is impossible to travel to the past or future. 
(P3) If time travel is possible, then it is possible to travel to the past or future. 
(C2) If presentism is true, then time travel is impossible. 
The first premise goes analytic if by ‘the past and future’ we have in mind 
concrete temporal locations. Although presentists may believe that all abstract 
times – plausibly thought of as maximal consistent propositions – exist in the 
present, they will claim that only one of these propositions is true, and moreover, 
it is the one and only concrete time that makes it so.10 And it is surely the concrete 
conception of times at work in the Nowhere Argument, for I doubt it makes much 
sense at all to speak of traveling to a proposition. So only (P2) and (P3) are up for 
grabs. The rationale for (P2) can be put as follows: traveling is a two-place 
relation, one that holds between a traveler and a destination. Given the general 
principle that no relation can hold without coexisting relata, it follows that no one 
can travel to a nonexistent destination. The rationale for (P3) is presumably 
intuitive: in order to travel in time, one must travel to the past or future. Given 
these rationales, the argument naturally progresses as follows. In cases of time 
travel, the destination relatum would be a concrete time.11 But, if presentism is 
true, there are no nonpresent concrete times. As such, presentism entails that 
traveling to the past or future is impossible because (i) no past or future concrete 
times exist according to presentism, and (ii) the traveling relation cannot hold 
with respect to the nonexistent.12 From here, the second conclusion comes easy: 
                                                                
9 The Nowhere Argument goes back (at least) to Grey, “Troubles,” 56-7, and is endorsed (among 
others) by Grey, “Troubles;” Perszyk and Smith, “The Paradoxes;” and Peter Eldridge-Smith, 
“Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel,” in Art and Time, eds. Jan Lloyd Jones, Paul 
Campbell, and Peter Wylie (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2007).  
10 On the abstract-/concrete-time distinction see Markosian, “A Defense,” 32-3.  
11 It is popular to identify concrete times with three-dimensional hyperplanes of spacetime or 
maximal mereological sums of contemporaneous concreta. For my purposes, however, it won’t 
be necessary to endorse any particular account. 
12 As I have described it, the Nowhere Argument is an instance of the familiar problem of cross-
time relations. There is a considerable amount literature on this topic. For some useful 
discussion, see Roderick Chisholm, “Referring to Things That No Longer Exist,” Philosophical 
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since time travel surely requires traveling to the past or future, and presentists 
cannot allow for such travel, presentism entails the impossibility of time travel.  
2.1. Against Objections to the Second Premise 
Unfortunately, many philosophers have focused their scrutiny on (P2) of the 
Nowhere Argument. In this section, I will consider – and reject – two popular 
ways of objecting to this premise. The more common way of fleshing out this 
objection is with a simple reductio: if (P2) is true, then the argument rules out too 
much: the ordinary passage of time.13 This is supposedly because the passage of 
time involves persisting objects traveling to the immediate future, which 
(according to presentists) is just as nonexistent as the distant past. This is a bad 
objection. Presentists will not equate ordinary persistence with traveling to the 
immediate future. To see why, we need to understand what presentists say the 
passage of time consists in.  
Presentism is a version of the A-theory of time – the view that tensed 
statements are irreducible, typically in the sense that tensed sentence tokens 
cannot be given tenseless truth conditions.14 In order to express tensed truths, 
presentists traditionally utilize primitive tense operators (e.g. WAS, WILL) that 
attach to present-tensed sentences. For example: 
(1)  WAS (There are dinosaurs) 
According to A-theorists, tensed statements like (1) change their truth value 
over time. For example, (1) is true now, as it was a thousand years ago. But 1 
billion years ago, (1) was false. This is what the passage of time for presentists (qua 
A-theorists) consists in – the constant and inexorable change in the truth values of 
                                                                                                                                       
Perspectives 4 (1990): 546-56; Theodore Sider, “Presentism and Ontological Commitment,” 
Journal of Philosophy 96, 7 (1999): 325-47; Markosian, “A Defense;” Thomas Crisp, “Presentism 
and ‘Cross-Time’ Relations,” American Philosophical Quarterly 42, 1 (2005): 5-17; and Bourne, 
A Future, 95-108.   
13 For endorsements of this objection, see Phil Dowe, “The Case for Time Travel,” Philosophy 
75, 3 (2000): 443; Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should,” 335; Sider, “Traveling,” 329; and 
Daniels, “Back to the Present,” 472. 
14 In particular, A-theorists resist the reduction of tense to times. Those that endorse this 
reduction (i.e. B-theorists) would say that an utterance of ‘there were dinosaurs’ expresses a 
truth if and only if there exists some time t such that (i) there are dinosaurs at t, and (ii) t is 
earlier than the time of utterance. For more on this detensing strategy, see Theodore Sider, Four 
Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
11-25. 
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tensed propositions.15 This makes the phenomenon of ordinary persistence quite 
different from traveling to the immediate future. After all, traveling essentially 
consists in a change of relations to external objects, but “keeping flow” with the 
passage of time on this conception does not, for the continuation of the successive 
process by which the truth values of tensed propositions change is not dependent 
upon any objectual change in external relations.16 On presentism, therefore, 
ordinary persistence does not amount to anything like traveling. (P2) thereby 
poses no threat to the passage of time, and so this first objection fails. 
Other philosophers have rejected (P2) on different grounds; they claim that 
one can travel to a nonexistent place as long as it exists upon arrival.17 Here is one 
example involving spatial travel to a nonexistent location, due to John W. Carroll: 
Suppose you are a big fan of amusement parks and hear that they are planning to 
build a new one in Argentina. It doesn’t exist yet, but you are so excited that you 
start now to hitchhike your way there from Raleigh, NC. It seems that you are 
traveling to the amusement park even though it doesn’t exist. What seems 
important is not that the destination exists when you start to travel, but that it 
exists when you arrive.18  
The case is unpersuasive. A more accurate description would go like this: 
you start to travel to some existing place – Argentina – which is such that it will 
be the case that when you arrive there, it contains an amusement park. We can 
preserve the original intuition by saying that an utterance of ‘I’m traveling to the 
amusement park in Argentina’ expresses something like a “quasi-truth”19 when the 
following closely related facts obtain: 
(2)  I’m traveling to Argentina, and 
(3)  WILL (An amusement park exists in Argentina and I arrive there) 
                                                                
15 Non-presentist A-theorists may wish to insist that the passage of time consists in the process 
by which objects successively possess different A-properties like pastness, presentness, and 
futurity. Presentists cannot endorse this account of passage because on their view it is 
impossible for anything to possess genuine pastness or futurity.   
16 This is related to the debate over whether time could pass without change. I take it that 
presentists are firmly in the camp that says “yes.” For a representative defense of the possibility 
of temporal passage without change, see Sidney Shoemaker, “Time Without Change,” Journal of 
Philosophy 66, 12 (1969): 363-81. 
17 For endorsements of this objection, see Dowe, “The Case,” 443; Miller, “Time Travel,” 226. 
18 “The Nowhere Argument,” A Time Travel Website, accessed December 30, 2013, ed. John W. 
Carroll, http://timetravelphilosophy.net/topics/nowhere/. 
19 Roughly, a quasi-truth is something appropriate to assent to in everyday circumstances, 
although not literally true. On the notion of quasi-truth, see Sider “Presentism;” and Markosian, 
“A Defense,” 24-5.  
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This response makes the case of spatial travel on offer inapplicable as a 
counterexample to (P2).20   
Given that presentists think time is very different from space, they will 
likely want to resist the likening of time travel to spatial travel. Contra spatial 
travel, time travel simply cannot be a genuinely relational affair for presentists. 
This is because presentists cannot (or at least should not) believe that it is possible 
for any genuine cross-temporal relation to hold, for the simple and powerful 
reason that no relation can hold without coexisting relata. As such, I think 
presentists should welcome the truth of (P2) with open arms. However, now 
aware of the explanation for this concession, we should be skeptical of the third 
premise: 
(P3)  If time travel is possible, then it is possible to travel to the past or 
future.   
In order for the argument be valid, the sense of ‘travel’ at work here must 
be the same relational sense that backs (P2). Importantly, this exposes a crucial bit 
of the rationale for (P3) that was not initially apparent – namely, that time travel 
is genuinely relational. But now we can see that (P3) entails that there must exist a 
(concrete) nonpresent time in order to time travel, which is tantamount to the 
position that traveling in time requires that presentism be false! Although prima 
facie this premise appeared conceptually true (probably because ‘time travel’ 
contains the word ‘travel’), closer inspection has revealed it to be inconspicuously 
question-begging. As such, if it can be shown that presentists can make 
metaphysical sense of time travel being non-relational, this will give us a reason to 
reject (P3). I hope to do just this. My plan is to show that presentists have the 
                                                                
20 It may be possible to repair the spatial-analogy case. For example, imagine a case where some 
person, x, knows that (say) God is going to create a new closed spatial region. God’s plan is to 
connect the new region to the finite open space that x inhabits. Given her knowledge, x begins 
to travel to the nonexistent space at t1, arriving when it appears at t2:      
 
But is it strictly-speaking true that x is traveling to the nonexistent closed space at t1? I think 
not. Again, we can cite “in the ballpark” facts that suffice to make it quasi-true, like: (i) x is 
traveling to the “edge” of the open space at t1, and (ii) WILL (there exists a closed space 
connected to the “edge” of the open space and x arrives there).  
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resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional 
Lewisian view without commitment to any nonpresent entities. I will turn to this 
task in the next section.  
2.2. A Presentist-Friendly Endorsement 
Keller, Nelson, Paul Daniels, and Ryan Wasserman all agree that presentists can 
translate time travel talk into appropriately tensed language.21 In this section, I 
follow them and show exactly how presentists can account for the facts that make 
for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view of what time travel consists in. 
The traditional view is best articulated by David Lewis himself: 
What is time travel? Inevitably, it involves a discrepancy between time and time. 
Any traveler departs and then arrives at his destination; the time elapsed from 
departure to arrival (positive, or perhaps zero) is the duration of the journey. But 
if he is a time traveler, the separation in time between departure and arrival does 
not equal the duration of his journey.22  
Lewis goes on to make a useful distinction between external time and 
personal time. The former is simply time itself, which provides an objective 
ordering and metric of an object’s stages.23, 24 An object’s personal time, by 
contrast, provides a subjective ordering – the assignment of coordinates to its 
stages which maintains the regularities and physical processes common to its 
kind.25 The motivation for this distinction is easy to see. Before entering her time 
machine, a pastward time traveler may appropriately utter ‘In just a few seconds I 
will see dinosaurs,’ but in this case the traveler is really going millions of years 
                                                                
21 Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should;” Daniels, “Back to the Present;” Wasserman, The 
Paradoxes.  
22 David Lewis, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel,” American Philosophical Quarterly 13, 2 (1976): 
145. 
23 For the purposes of this paper, I am assuming that time is one-dimensional and continuous. 
Moreover, I will not consider the possibility of branching timelines or “closed time-like curves.” 
For a useful discussion on how closed time-like curves relate to presentist time travel, see 
Bradley Monton, “Presentists Can Believe in Closed Timelike Curves,” Analysis 63, 3 (2003).  
24 I will often use vocabulary associated with perdurantism, the view that material objects 
persist by virtue of having different temporal parts – or “stages” – at each moment they exist. 
Endurantists deny the existence of temporal parts of material objects, and will therefore need to 
understand talk of stages neutrally where needed. One option is to utilize object-time ordered 
pairs. Another option is to let short-lived events of an object’s life take the place of temporal 
parts. On this latter strategy, see Ned Markosian, “Two Arguments from Sider’s Four 
Dimensionalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, 3 (2004): 675-6. 
25 Lewis only explicitly gives this account for persons, but it easily generalizes. See Lewis, 
“Paradoxes,” 146.  
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into the past, not a few seconds into the future. With the relevant distinction in 
hand, this utterance becomes less paradoxical: we can say that just a few seconds 
of the traveler’s personal time will elapse between her entering the time machine 
and arriving millions of years in the external past. This kind of discrepancy 
between external time and personal time is what makes for time travel on the 
traditional Lewisian view: 
LEWISIAN TIME TRAVEL (LTT) 
Necessarily, something travels in time iff and because there is a discrepancy 
between its personal time and external time.26 
Although Lewis’s distinction is a good one, his functional account of 
personal time is inadequate. Wasserman explains: 
…consider the case of a single, non-time traveling electron. Suppose that some of 
its stages are labeled in order (1, 2, 3, etc.) according to external time. And 
suppose further that every electron remains intrinsically unchanged throughout 
its entire career. In that case, one can assign coordinates to the stages of our 
particular electron in many different ways and still preserve the kinds of 
regularities we ordinarily see in other electrons. For example, one can simply 
reverse the ordering of all the electron-stages. In that case, there would be 
discrepancy between the “personal” time of the electron and external time, but 
that would not make the electron a time traveler.27 
To solve this problem, Wasserman proposes a revised account according to 
which “an object’s personal time is the assignment of coordinates to its stages that 
matches the coordinates given by the relevant causal relation”28 – where ‘relevant 
causal relation’ picks out whatever immanent causal relation makes for identity 
over time. The background assumption for this account is the common belief that 
identity over time (for material objects) requires the right kind of causal 
dependence between an object’s stages.29 Importantly, this account appropriately 
privileges a unique ordering of the electron’s stages and thereby avoids the worry 
above. 
                                                                
26 LTT is endorsed (among others) by Lewis, “Paradoxes;” Dowe, “The Case;” Sider, Four 
Dimensionalism; Sider, “Traveling;” Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should;” Monton, 
“Presentists Can;” Alasdair Richmond, “Recent Work on Time Travel,” Philosophical Books 44, 
4 (2003): 297-309; Frank Arntzenius, “Time Travel: Double Your Fun,” Philosophical Compass 
1, 6 (2006): 599-616; Steven Hales, “No Time Travel;” Wasserman, The Paradoxes. 
27 Wasserman, The Paradoxes, 39.  
28 Wasserman, The Paradoxes, 34. 
29 See David Lewis, “Survival and Identity,” in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, 
Vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).  
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By introducing a sentential personal tense operator, as utilized below, we 
can give a more careful account of personal time that employs Wasserman’s 
revision. First, let’s take a look at how eternalists would characterize the account 
(for simplicity, I’ve only provided truth conditions for the non-metric future-
tensed personal tense operator, and only as it applies to presently existing objects): 
ETERNALIST PERSONAL TIME (EPT) 
WILL-BE-FOR-O (Φ) at t ↔ (i) O exists and has features F1-Fn at t, (ii) there 
exists some time t* and some object x such that x has features G1-Gn at t* and Φ at 
t*, and (iii) O existing and having features F1-Fn at t immanently causes it to be 
the case (in the relevant way) that x exists with features G1-Gn at t*. 
For the eternalist, the personal tense operator reduces to temporally-
indexed qualitative facts and immanent causal relations involving timelessly 
existing stages. On this account, to say that it will be the case for some object O 
that Φ is (basically) to say that O has a stage causally downstream at some time 
where Φ. To see the account at work, consider:  
 
FIGURE 1 
FIGURE 1 depicts a case of discontinuous time travel to the past. The x-axis (t1-t4) 
represents external time, whilst the numbered circles (①-④) represent the 
Thomas Hall 
150 
ordering of the object’s stages according to the relevant immanent causal relation. 
The object persists normally from t3 to t4, where its departure-stage (i.e. ②) 
activates a time machine, causing it to be the case (represented by the curved 
arrow) that its arrival-stage (i.e. ③) appears at t1, where it again persists normally 
until t2.There is a discrepancy between the object’s relevant causal ordering and its 
external ordering: ③ is in the causal future and the external past of ②. By EPT, 
the object’s relevant causal ordering is equivalent to its personal time ordering, 
thereby allowing us to capture the illustrated LTT-discrepancy: ③ is both a 
personal successor and an external predecessor of ②.  
Presentists cannot describe the discrepancy in this way. To see why, assume 
that presentism is true and t4 is present. In this case, ③ simply doesn’t exist, and 
so it can neither be temporally prior nor a personal successor of anything.30 But we 
should not expect presentists to be able to conform to the eternalist’s 
characterization of the discrepancy – they will want to do it in their own terms. 
The general approach I wish to take towards a presentist-friendly description 
involves making use of appropriately tensed claims, as first suggested by Keller and 
Nelson:  
But the presentist can have just the same patterns of events happening at just the 
same times. Or at least, it can be the case on the presentist model that the right 
sorts of events will happen, or did happen, or are happening, at the right sorts of 
times.31  
In agreement here, I take it that if presentism is even to make it to the 
starting line, it must allow for some way or other of understanding the facts that 
eternalists utilize to characterize time travel cases – namely, (i) facts about the 
ordering of an object’s stages according to external time, and (ii) facts about how 
an object’s stages relate causally. Fortunately, a presentist-friendly description of 
the external ordering an object’s stages can be found with ease. With respect to 
FIGURE 1, for example, instead of saying that ③ is an external predecessor of ②, 
presentists can say the following (where t4 is the present time): 
                                                                
30 Endurantists will need to understand this claim in their own terms, for on their view the 
departure and arrival “stages” are really one and the same wholly present object. As I noted in 
fn.24, there are two promising ways for the endurantist to understand stage-talk. One way is for 
the endurantist to replace the perdurantist’s stages with short-lived events of an object’s life-
event, rather than literal parts of the object. The endurantist could then take the numbered 
circles to denote the relevant instantaneous events. Alternatively, the endurantist could take the 
numbered circles to denote ordered pairs of the object and a particular concrete time. Thanks to 
Hud Hudson for pushing me on this.   
31 Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should,” 338. 
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(4)  ② exists and ③ does not, and 
(5)  WAS (③ exists and ② does not) 
An important feature of the presentist’s primitive tense operators is that they are 
ontologically noncommittal: the apparent existential commitments of quantifiers 
and referring terms within their scope are negated.32 As such, presentists can 
accept the truth of (5) without being committed to the existence of past arrival-
stage ③.  
The more difficult task is articulating a presentist-friendly account of 
personal time that will allow us to capture the relevant causal ordering of the 
object’s stages. Although presentists cannot accept EPT because it quantifies over 
nonpresent entities, they can easily regiment the account with tense operators to 
begin to alleviate such commitment. But this won’t be enough. In order to 
complete such an account of personal time, we need a presentist-friendly way of 
capturing the fact that an object has an appropriate causal successor in the external 
past or future. 
Unfortunately, the metaphysics of causation has been especially 
troublesome for presentists. We can appreciate the standard worry given a few 
popular assumptions: (i) the causal relata are physical objects (e.g. events), (ii) 
causation is not always simultaneous, and (iii) if c causes e, then both c and e exist. 
Now here’s the punch: if causation at least sometimes occurs at a temporal 
distance, and if the relevant physical relata need exist in order for said relation to 
hold, then presentism is straightforwardly false.33 One response on behalf of the 
presentist is to drop the physical requirement – perhaps the causal relata are best 
taken to be abstract entities that exist in the present. Presentists are likely to posit 
a variety of tensed facts, for example, and may happily make use of them as the 
causal relata.34 However, there are a few reasons to dislike fact-causation to which 
                                                                
32 More familiar operators share this feature as well. For example, modal primitivists who accept 
the view that everything is actual traditionally take the modal operator ‘POSSIBLY’ to work in 
this way; e.g. the truth of ‘POSSIBLY (There are talking donkeys)’ brings no commitment to 
talking donkeys.   
33 An argument along these lines is considered by John Bigelow, “Presentism and Properties,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 35-52; Dean Zimmerman, “Chisholm and the Essences of 
Events,” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, ed. Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 
1997); Michael Tooley, Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Sider, 
“Presentism;” Markosian, “A Defense;” Bourne, A Future; and Brannon McDaniel, “Presentism 
and Absence Causation: An Exercise in Mimicry,” Australian Journal of Philosophy 88, 2 (2009): 
323-32. 
34 On fact-causation, see Jonathan Bennett, Events and Their Names (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1988), 21-49.   
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I am largely sympathetic.35 Nevertheless, for those that do not share such quibbles, 
everything that follows could be accomplished just as well in a fact-causation 
framework. Although I can’t argue for it here, the option I prefer presentists take 
is to leave behind the idea that causation is a metaphysically distinguished 
relation.36 As such, I think presentists ought to deny that ‘c causes e’ (where ‘c’ and 
‘e’ purport to name existing relata) is the correct fundamental locution for 
causation. Following Sider, presentists will benefit from utilizing a two-place 
sentential causal operator, providing ‘BECAUSE (Φ), WILLN-UNITS-OF-TIME-HENCE (Ψ)’ 
for ordinary (forward-directed) causation, and ‘BECAUSE (Φ), WASN-UNITS-OF-TIME-
AGO (Ψ)’ for backward causation.37 What is most important for my purposes is that 
this approach allows presentists to engage in causal-talk without ontological 
commitment to nonpresent entities. For example, take: 
(6)  Jen’s currently activating the time machine causes her appearance in 
Seattle 30 years ago. 
By utilizing the causal operator, (6) can be translated into: 
(7)  BECAUSE (Jen activates the time machine), WASTHIRTY-YEARS-AGO (Jen 
appears in Seattle)  
Although (6) apparently commits us to the existence of the event Jen’s appearing 
in Seattle, (7) allows us to countenance the same causal connection without this 
commitment.  
Certain tangential issues aside, I will adopt this general approach to 
causation.38,39 But before we can usefully employ the causal operator in a 
presentist-friendly account of personal time, we also need to be able to pick out 
the right kind of causal explanation – namely, the one that makes for identity over 
time. To explicitly represent the explanation required, I will simply subscript the 
causal operator with ‘ID’ which will do the same stipulatory work as ‘in the 
                                                                
35 For one, the fact-causation theorist sacrifices neutrality with respect to the granularity of 
facts. Moreover, she will have to justify taking the causal relata to be causally-inert entities. 
36 This is where my view differs substantially from that of Keller and Nelson, who agree that “if 
causation can be a cross-time relation on the four-dimensionalist view, then it can be one on the 
presentist view too.” See Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should,” 341.    
37 See Sider, “Presentism,” 338; and Sider, “Traveling,” 5.  
38 For some worries involving this approach, see Sider, “Presentism,” 339-40. 
39 It is worth noting that adopting the causal operator does not commit one to any substantive 
thesis about the metaphysical basis for causation. In other words, presentists certainly don’t 
have to take the causal operator as primitive. One plausible reductive view that presentists could 
opt for, for example, says that the causal operator reduces to the laws of nature plus the 
instantiation of qualitative properties and single-time relations. 
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relevant way’ in EPT. Presentists can then say ‘BECAUSEID (O exists and has such-
and-such features), WILL/WAS (there exists a y with such-and-such features)’ to 
express that some object O has an appropriate causal successor in the external 
future/past. We can now produce a complete account of presentist personal time 
that substantively mirrors EPT (again, I’ve only provided truth conditions for the 
non-metric future-tensed personal tense operator, and only as it applies to 
presently existing objects): 
PRESENTIST PERSONAL TIME (PPT) 
WILL-BE-FOR-O (Φ) ↔ O exists and has features F1-Fn and either:  
(i) WILL (There exists some y such that y has features G1-Gn and Φ) and 
BECAUSEID (O exists and has features F1-Fn), WILL (There exists some 
y such that y has features G1-Gn), or  
(ii) WAS (There exists some y such that y has features G1-Gn and Φ) and 
BECAUSEID (O exists and has features F1-Fn), WAS (There exists some y 
such that y has features G1-Gn).40 
PPT reveals that by appropriately employing tense and (subscripted) causal 
operators, we can straightforwardly emulate EPT in a way that is friendly to a 
presentist’s ontology.41 For a visual representation of the account at work, we can 
reconstruct (part of) FIGURE 1 into a presentist-friendly model as shown below: 
 
                                                                
40 Cf. Wasserman, The Paradoxes.   
41 It is worth noting that PPT can be used to (accurately) describe the personal futures of 
ordinary persisting objects. For example, imagine that I plan to order pizza tonight so that it is 
now true that it will be for me that I order pizza. This is true because it will be the case that 
someone appropriately causally related to me orders pizza. More carefully: 
WILL-BE-FOR-O (O orders pizza) iff (i) O exists and has features F1-Fn, (ii) 
WILL (There exists some y such that y has features G1-Gn and O orders pizza) 
and (iii) BECAUSEID (O exists and has features F1-Fn), WILL (There exists some y 
such that y has features G1-Gn). 
As such, PPT seems to successfully undermine a worry articulated by Sider, “Traveling,” 333; 
my emphasis: 
That I will view a dinosaur in my personal future amounts merely to the fact that I once 
viewed a dinosaur, and moreover that this is caused by my entry into a time machine. Since 
this fact bears little resemblance to the facts that constitute a normal person’s genuine 
future, I could not enter the time machine with anticipation and excitement at the thought 
of seeing a dinosaur, for it is not true that I am about to see a dinosaur, nor is the truth 





FIGURE 2 depicts “two” instantaneous cross-sections of the eternalist’s block in 
FIGURE 1.42 The present time is t4, and thus according to presentism, ② exists 
and ③ does not. However, presentists are happy to say that it was the case that 
③ exists and ② does not, thereby capturing the relevant external ordering of the 
object’s stages. Similarly to FIGURE 1, the direction of immanent causation is 
represented by the curved arrow (although contra FIGURE 1, it is important to 
remember that it does not signify a genuine causal relation here). Given that ② 
existing now with various features immanently causally explains (in the relevant 
way) that it was the case that ③ exists with various features, PPT secures the 
relevant personal ordering of the object’s stages – that although ② exists and ③ 
does not according to external time, it will be for O that ③ exists and ② does 
not. Presentists are therefore equally capable of accounting for the illustrated 
                                                                
42 Some might object to the possibility of discontinuous presentist time travel (as depicted 
above). One way to do this is to endorse the view that temporal continuity is necessary for 
identity over time. However, as Keller and Nelson argue, this is a problem equally suited for 
eternalists and presentists alike. See Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should,” 339. Another way 
is to endorse the view that discontinuous causation is impossible. But again, it’s not clear how 
this view could be motivated on purely presentist grounds, and even if it could, the diagrams 
could be redrawn so as to depict continuous pastward time travel instead.  
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LTT-discrepancy, easily described as a discrepancy between personal tensed facts 
and ordinary tensed facts: e.g. it both will be for O that and was the case that ③ 
exists and ② does not. 
2.3. Against the Third Premise 
We are now in a position to forge a strong objection against (P3) of the Nowhere 
Argument. As I suggested above, I think it should be of no great surprise that 
presentist-friendly time travel will not involve literally traveling to the past or 
future. As Kristie Miller has said,  
in some sense the presentist can never travel to the past… what is the case is that 
it is now true that some current individual did exist in the past, and that 
individual’s existence in the past is caused by her existence in the present.43  
Similarly, Wasserman suggests that presentists may say time travel  
involves making certain past- or future-tensed statements true by acting on 
presently existing objects (programming flux capacitors, turning on time 
machines, etc.).44  
As I hope to have illuminated above, this kind of approach can be finessed so as to 
provide a way of countenancing the facts that make for time travel on the 
standard view without bringing in any commitment to nonpresent entities. This is 
significant because given the relational sense of ‘travel’ at work in the Nowhere 
Argument, (P3) entails that if time travel is possible, then it’s possible that a 
(concrete) non-present time exists. So, this premise can be reasonably rejected on 
the grounds that (i) LTT is true, and (ii) presentists have the resources to account 
for the facts that make for time travel according to LTT without commitment to 
any nonpresent entities. In other words, (P3) is false because presentists can make 
sense of time travel being a non-relational affair. On my view this is accomplished 
by constructing a presentist-friendly account of personal time through the 
appropriate employment of tense and causal operators, thereby allowing 
presentists to characterize LTT-discrepancies as a mismatch between personal 
tensed facts and ordinary tensed facts. Of course none of this proves that presentist 
time travel is genuinely metaphysically possible – the point here is simply that the 
Nowhere Argument does not have the means to rule it out. 
 
 
                                                                
43 Miller, “Time Travel,” 226. 
44 Wasserman, The Paradoxes, 38. 
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3. The Suicide Machine Argument 
Steven Hales endorses a different argument for the incompossibility of presentism 
and time travel which he dubs the ‘Suicide Machine Argument.’45 The basic idea is 
quite simple: if all of reality is confined to the present, then leaving the present to 
travel in time ultimately amounts to killing yourself. Hales also says that “the 
moves that presentists make to get around the Nowhere Argument are not 
successful to fend off the Suicide Machine Argument.”46 In this section, I will 
argue that Hales’ argument fails for much the same reason the Nowhere Argument 
fails.   
First, some thoughts about suicide. Hales says that “[f]or presentists, getting 
into a time machine is suicide – the occupant goes out of existence.”47 The 
principle being relied on here seems to be this:  
(8)  For any person, x, x commits suicide by Φing if Φing causes x to go 
out of existence.  
The intuitive force is clear: being taken from the whole of reality is tantamount to 
annihilation.  But before we get on board too quickly, consider the eternalist’s 
model in which all of an object’s stages exist timelessly within spacetime. On this 
picture, there is a definite sense (i.e. the wholly unrestricted, atemporal sense) in 
which it is impossible for an object to go out of existence – but surely, I would 
think, suicide would not be an impossible feat if eternalism were true. Granted, as 
long as Hales’ claim is charitably construed merely as a sufficient condition, the 
fact that it is impossible (on the eternalist’s model) to go out of existence would 
not entail the impossibility of eternalist suicide. But what alternative principle 
would the eternalist opt for – that is, what would the eternalist say suicide consists 
in? Plausibly: 
(9)  For any person, x, x commits suicide by Φing iff Φing causes x to 
have no personal future. 
This principle turns out to be good news for the compossibility of 
presentism and time travel, for the relevant condition is not only sufficient, but 
                                                                
45 Hales, “No Time Travel.” For a response to the argument, see Jimmy Licon, “No Suicide for 
Presentists: A Response To Hales,” Logos and Episteme 2, 3 (2011): 455-64. For a rebuttal, see 
Steven Hales, “Reply to Licon on Time Travel,” Logos and Episteme 2, 4 (2011): 633-36. Also, 
see replies from Jimmy Licon, “Still No Suicide for Presentists: Why Hales’ Response Fails,” 
Logos and Episteme 3, 1 (2012): 145-51; and Jimmy Licon, “Dissecting the Suicide Machine 
Argument,” Logos and Episteme 4, 3 (2013): 339-52. 
46 Hales, “No Time Travel,” 353. 
47 Hales, “No Time Travel,” 357. 
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necessary. Analogously to the eternalist’s account of personal time, PPT says that 
the direction of one’s personal future is determined by the direction of the 
relevant immanent causal explanation. As such, as long as this immanent causal 
explanation can be directed (say) backwards in time, presentism allows time 
travelers to (i) go out of existence, and yet (ii) have a personal future in the 
external past.48 Therefore, by rejecting (8) and instead following eternalists in 
accepting (9), presentists can sensibly say that time travel is not suicide.     
Given the worries above, I think the best chance this argument has of 
succeeding is to formulate it without talk of suicide: 
THE SUICIDE MACHINE ARGUMENT  
(P1)  If presentism is true, then necessarily, if an object leaves the present, 
it goes out of existence. 
(P2)  Necessarily, if something travels in time, it leaves the present. 
(C1)  If presentism is true, then necessarily, if something travels in time, it 
goes out of existence. 
(P3)  If time travel is possible, then it’s not the case that necessarily, if 
something travels in time, it goes out of existence. 
(C2)  If presentism is true, then time travel is impossible. 
The first premise is uncontroversial: according to presentism everything is present, 
and so if an object leaves the present, it no longer exists. The rationale for (P2) is 
straightforward as well: there is simply no such thing as a time traveler who never 
leaves the present.      
That leaves (P3). The rationale here is unclear. At one point, Hales says that 
“[eternalists] insist that any sort of successful travel, spatial or temporal, involves 
the traveler existing at departure and safely arriving, intact and still in reality, at 
the arrival.”49 So perhaps the rationale for (P3) is supposed to be this: in order to 
successfully travel in time, the traveler must exist upon departure and arrival. But 
notice that this poses no threat to the compossibility of presentism and time travel, 
                                                                
48 Some presentists deny the possibility of backwards causation (e.g. see Bourne, A Future, 134), 
and on such grounds could argue that backwards time travel is impossible. But in order for such 
an argument to show that there is something about presentism in and of itself that rules out the 
possibility of time travel, the motivation for ruling out backwards causation would need to be 
presentist-inspired as well. One such motivation is noted by Sider, “Traveling,” fn.5 who 
suggests that presentists could rule out backwards causation via their acceptance of anti-
reductionism about the direction of time, plus the view that causation reduces (in part) to the 
direction of time.   
49 Hales, “No Time Travel,” 358. 
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for presentists may assert that it was the case that or will be the case that a 
traveler’s arrival-stage exists at its respective arrival-time. With respect to 
FIGURE 2 for example, the depicted traveler’s arrival-stage ③ existed at its 
arrival-time t1. A more plausible take on Hales’ rationale for (P3) requires us to 
focus on the ‘still’ in the quote above. The idea here, I presume, is not only that 
time travelers must exist upon departure and arrival, but that they must exist upon 
arrival after their departure. But ‘after’ here could mean personally after or 
externally after. Let’s look at each in turn: 
(R1)  Successful time travel requires existing upon arrival personally after  
departure. 
(R2)  Successful time travel requires existing upon arrival externally after 
departure. 
If (R1) is the rationale at work, there is again no threat here. A presentist 
time traveler’s departure-stage only needs to have the relevant immanent causal 
impact on their arrival-stage in order for PPT to secure the fact that the traveler 
exists upon arrival personally after their departure. With respect to FIGURE 2 for 
example, O’s departure-stage ② immanently causes it to be the case (in the 
relevant way) that it was the case that O’s arrival-stage ③ exists, making it true 
that O exits upon arrival personally after departure (i.e. making it true at 
departure that it will be for O that O exists). And relatedly, this personal tensed 
fact is true despite the fact that O goes out of existence upon departure. As such, 
(R1) would not be an effective rationale behind (P3) because the truth of (R1) is 
compatible with the requirement that time travelers must go out of existence upon 
departure. To reiterate the point made above, this is because the direction of one’s 
personal future is determined by the direction of immanent causation. As long as a 
presentist time traveler is able to make the appropriate tensed statements about 
them true, existing upon arrival personally after an existence-ending departure is 
no problem. And in fact, barring the possibility of branching personal futures, 
going out of existence upon departure is an unsurprising consequence of securing 
a personal future beyond the present (if presentism is true). Given that (R1) is 
both easily embraced by presentists and naturally compatible with the denial of 
(P3), it fails as a candidate rationale. 
What if (R2) is the rationale at work? Before we can evaluate this option, a 
note of clarification is in order. (R2) should not be interpreted as claiming that 
successful time travel requires the traveler to exist at some post-departure time, 
for this would rule out eternalist pastward time travel just as much as presentist 
pastward time travel. Rather, (R2) should be interpreted as claiming that 
successful time travel requires it to be true at some post-departure time that the 
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traveler exists in the wholly unrestricted, atemporal sense of ‘exists.’ On this 
reading, (R2) does in fact support (P3), for if time travelers must exist externally 
after their departure, it can’t (also) be the case that time travelers must completely 
go out of existence upon departure. More, the rationale constitutes a threat to the 
compossibility of presentism and time travel; presentists cannot allow (say) a 
pastward time traveler to exist upon arrival externally after their departure, for 
this would commit them to the existence of the respective past arrival-time. Given 
these features, I take it that (R2) must be the intended rationale behind (P3). But 
just like the rationale behind the third premise of the Nowhere Argument, (R2) 
amounts to the question-begging position that time travel requires the existence of 
a (concrete) nonpresent time!50 To see this, take a look at FIGURE 2. If it must be 
true externally after t4 that O exists upon arrival, then it must also be true 
externally after t4 that O’s past arrival-time, t1, exists. (P3) of the Suicide Machine 
Argument can therefore be rejected on familiar grounds: (i) LTT is true, and (ii) 
presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel 
according to LTT without commitment to any nonpresent entities. As it turns out, 
the Suicide Machine Argument fails for much the same reason the Nowhere 
Argument fails.  
4. Conclusion 
A time traveler in a presentist world cannot travel to the past or future, for there 
are no such places to travel to. More, such a time traveler naturally pays the price 
of nonexistence in order to secure a personal future at odds with external time. 
But as long as the requisite tensed statements are made true and such a deviant 
personal future is achieved, the obtaining of the associated LTT-discrepancy will 
make the traveler just as much a genuine time traveler as one who inhabits the 
eternalist’s block. And as I have argued, neither the Nowhere Argument nor the 
Suicide Machine Argument have anything to say here.51   
 
                                                                
50 Jimmy Licon similarly accuses the Suicide Machine argument of begging the question. See 
Licon, “No Suicide.” 
51 Special thanks to Ryan Wasserman and Hud Hudson for providing helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.   
